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Abstract 
This study is an effort to shed some light on the causes of civil war. The literature on civil 
war onset has been framed under three main perspectives: cultural, political and economic 
approaches. Recent studies, however, tend to narrow the debate and posit explanations for civil 
war as either greed-motivated or grievance-motivated. This study replicates one of the most 
prominent econometric models on civil war, the Collier and Hoeffler model (CH), and further 
validated their economic interpretation of civil war as greed-motivated. Their argument is that 
greed-led behavior is motivated by an abundance of valuable resources. However, Collier and 
Hoeffler overlooked one critical element: scarce resources also contribute to discontent and 
violent protests. This study suggests that the CH model should include resource scarcity to avoid 
omitting variable bias. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
Between 1989 and 2003, the 116 wars that happened in 78 countries, only seven were 
inter-state conflicts. There is no doubt that civil wars have become increasingly frequent. But 
why do civil wars occur? What motivates civil war, and what does the literature has to offer? 
Why should we study it? The end of the Cold War and the decline of superpowers’ influence in 
the Third World did not provoke a decrease in the number of civil wars. Certainly, some armed 
conflicts were strongly influenced by the logic of the Cold War: civil wars in Cambodia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Mozambique come to mind. However, the conflicts in Afghanistan, 
Angola, Somalia and D.R. Congo occurred in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, we should 
carefully examine civil war because: “civil war is widespread; it causes tremendous suffering; it 
almost always affects and involves neighboring states, thereby undermining regional stability; it 
often engages the interests of distant powers and international organizations; and efforts to deal 
with the problems posed by internal conflict are in the process of being reassessed by policy 
makers at the national level and in regional and international organizations“ (Brown, 1996, p.3). 
Since the study of war and modern warfare became an important issue of research within 
the social sciences, different theories and schools of thought have tried to encompass plausible 
explanations of civil war. Two popular approaches have been framing what scholars consider as 
factors leading to civil war. A number of scholars argue that civil conflicts are a product of 
present and past grievances (Avruck, 1995; Appleby, 2000; Cliffe and Luckham, 1999; Reynal-
Querol, 20002; Richardson et al, 1960; Young, 1976). Others see rebellion as greed-oriented 
(Eldabawi and Sambanis, 2002; Keen, 1998; Klare, 2001; Leite and Weidmann, 1999). The 
former argue that the prevalence of weak political rights, religious or ethnic differences, and 
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inequality, produce grievances – thus stimulating violent strife. The latter emphasize the role of 
available opportunities as a crucial factor in rebel group formation; hence the outbreak of civil 
war is viewed as caused by economic opportunities. Some others contend that civil wars can 
occur when resources are abundant, thus increasing opportunities for loot and greed over its 
control (Auty, 2001; Richards, P. 1996; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001). 
A common trend in both these approaches is that natural resources produce grievances, 
undermine internal stability, thus paving the way for armed conflict episodes. Yet, some have 
argued that the scarcity and deprivation of natural resources have been fomenting grievances, 
thus increasing the likelihood of civil war (Binningso et al, 2006; Gleditsch, 2001; Homer-
Dixon, 1991; Myers, 1993; Renner, 1996). Their findings show that the causes of civil war lie in 
a permanent struggle for equal access and distribution of scarce renewable resources. 
In recent years, the greed approach has been advocated to explain civil war occurrence, 
and much of it is due to an influential study by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). The authors argue 
that the economic interpretation of rebellion as greed-oriented has more explanatory power when 
analyzing the causes behind civil war occurrences. Furthermore, they contend that motivations 
for rebellion and civil war occurrence are not based on grievances, as much political scientists 
have been arguing, but rather, on economic opportunities available to rebels. According to 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998), natural resources stand as profitable opportunities for greed-based 
behaviors, thus the control over such valuable natural resources is not only what leads rebel 
groups to form and act violently against governments and elites, but also a determinant in 
financing rebellions. 
The inference from the literature on the topic referenced here is that no consensus exist 
on the causal mechanisms that natural resources are claimed to have on civil war. Therefore, 
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with such contrasting views and disparate results, it is essential to clarify what constitutes 
explanations for civil war. This study attempts to accomplish such goal. In order to do so, this 
study replicates a prominent econometric model on the literature, the Collier-Hoeffler model on 
civil war. Their model encompasses a great number of factors (e.g. political repression, 
economic growth, ethnicity, primary commodity exports, to name a few) reported in the 
literature as explanations for civil war. The authors main conclusion is that primary commodity 
exports have a significant role in explaining civil war occurrence and that this relationship is 
non-linear, which further increases its relevance. In particular, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) 
advocate that the risk of conflict reaches its peak when primary commodity exports constitute 32 
percent of Gross Domestic Product.  
Notwithstanding, we argue that the authors overlooked one critical element: in some 
cases, civil war occurrence is not caused by the abundance of resources, rather by the scarcity of 
valuable natural resources, meaning that its unequal distribution generates grievances and gives 
rise to violent civil strife. Hence, our objective is to show that a model on civil war has to include 
environmental scarcity in order to fully explain the causes of civil conflict. Due to the fact that 
environmental scarcity data has only recently been collected, our dataset comprises 33 civil war 
episodes from 1980 to 1995, in 126 countries. 
This paper is structured as follows. After a brief introduction to the topic, chapter 2 
reviews the main cultural, political and economic theories on civil war. It is also presented the 
most popular study on the topic, the Collier-Hoeffler Model on Civil War – henceforth CH 
model – along with its theoretical argument and findings. Chapter 3 presents a new model on 
Civil War and the theory that supports it. The following chapter explains the operationalization 
of the new model proposed here and its research design. Chapter 5 presents the replication of the 
 4 
CH model and it will be argued that the model’s support for the greed approach led the authors to 
neglect the fact that many civilians depend on scarce natural resources. Chapter 6 provides the 
model’s statistical findings, and, finally, chapter 7, concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Review of the Literature on Civil War 
The study of war has been vastly researched and documented. From Thucydides’ 
Peloponnesian War and Machiavelli’s The Art of War, to Clausewitz’s Principles of War and 
more recently, Huntington’s The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations. Important questions have been raised and many answers still debated. This study does 
not deal with issues directly linked to the winning or losing of wars, such as leadership, external 
intervention or military coalitions. Rather, it focuses exclusively on the theoretical arguments put 
forth by academics on what constitutes explanations for civil war, a specific type of armed 
conflict. For that, this study reviews the main cultural, political, and economic theoretical 
perspectives on civil war onset. Before examining these three main approaches, let us define the 
concept of Civil War. According to Small and Singer (1982, p.210), a civil war is any “armed 
conflict that involves a military action internal to the metropole, the active participation of the 
national government, and effective resistance by both sides.” In an effort to further distinguish 
civil war from other internal conflicts, Singer and Small (1994) added that the violence observed 
in such internal conflict must exceed the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths, often in the 
same year the war episode started. Let us turn now to the cultural, political and economic 
theories of war. 
Cultural approach to civil war 
Marshall and Gurr (2005) identified fifteen out of twenty armed conflicts ongoing in 
2005 as motivated by ethnic concerns. It is relevant to the study of civil war as there are several 
cultural interpretations of ethnic confrontations. In general, these approaches tend to focus on the 
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role of culture and identity in ethnic rivalry. More specifically, these approaches contend that at 
the heart of ethnic conflict and civil wars lie a set of cultural differences and social cleavages – 
racial, religious or class cleavages – between competing ethnic groups.  
Primordialists view ethnicity as primordial, emotive affiliation; that is, people who 
belong to a certain ethnic group have a strong sense of community, a collective self-
consciousness, an emotive connection with their background (Geertz, 1963; Shils, 1957, 1995). 
This ‘natural’, emotive connection of ethnic affiliations is highly ethnocentric, leading 
primordialists to assert that when communities with strong ethnic identities become aware of 
other communities, inter-ethnic interactions may lead to violent confrontation. From a primordial 
perspective on ethnic behavior, we can infer that while ethnic similarity leads to cooperative 
behavior, ethnic differences lead to conflict. On one hand, ethnicity creates an intra-group 
consciousness capable of supportive and peaceful coexistence, and on the other, an inter-group 
destructive and violent relationship (Connor, 1993, 1994; Isaacs, 1975). In fact, ethnic groups are 
defined “by ascriptive differences, whether the indicum is color, appearance, language, religion, 
some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof” (Horrowitz, 1985).  
Similarly, believers in ancient group hatreds contend that causes for ethnic conflict can be 
found in antecedent hostility and past atrocities (Furnivall, 1948; Isaacs, 1975; Posen, 1993; 
Fearon, 1994; Figueiredo and Weingast, 1997).  This theory certainly can explain the observed 
hostility between Cambodians and Vietnamese in Cambodia however, this theory cannot explain 
why ethnic conflict occurred between ethnic groups that had no past historical interactions. 
Moreover, it has been proven that identities can vary and change over time (Young, 1976). 
Ethnic conflict has also been said to be caused by a clash of civilizations or cultures. 
Culture can bind and distinguish an ethnic group from another. Fundamental cultural differences 
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and conflictual values cause fear and violent friction between contending ethnic groups 
(Huntington, 1996; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Norris and Ingleharst, 2004). However, it is 
possible that discrimination and inequality, or even cultural change may bring together different 
ethnic groups (or their members). As Horrowitz (1998) points out, “longstanding ethnic divisions 
of labor are usually shields, rather than swords, in conflict”. 
A group of scholars argue that modernization paves the way for violent conflict between 
ethnic groups (Melson and Wolpe, 1970; Olzak and Nagel, 1986; Newman, 1991; Tellis, Szayna, 
and Winnefeld, 1998). The idea behind modernization theory is that modernization produces 
rapid economic and social change. These forces may result in an increased group competition 
over scarce resources, which in turn solidifies group identities and promotes conflict (Connor, 
1994).  
Others like Figueiredo and Weingast (1996), Brass (1997), Vail (1991), favor an 
‘instrumentalist’ view of ethnic war. They argue that conflict is product of elite mobilization of 
ethnic groups. In the quest for personal interests and power, predatory elites incite acts of 
violence, revive old hatreds and create group myths. The elite mobilization of ethnic groups is 
possible through manipulation and stereotyping of ethnic identities, constant chauvinist appeals 
to group behaviors and low costs in both mobilization and recruitment. Intergroup conflict is, 
thus, engineered by predatory elites. 
In clear contrast with primordialism, constructivism does not consider identity as 
inherently conflictual, and its main focus is to “identify the social origins of identity and 
establish patterns of evolution of identity as a result of social interactions, linking specific social 
systems and pathological patterns of identity evolution to the outbreak of civil violence” 
(Sambanis, 2003). For constructivists like Wendt (1992) identity is socially constructed, meaning 
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that it is subject to changes and evolution, e.g. old enemies can become new friends. Others like 
Fearon and Laitin (2000) are skeptical about primordialist arguments as it shows limited 
evidence to be related with ethnic violence, hence, the authors favor the social constructivist and 
rationalist approaches to ethnic conflict which consider identities as something that changes 
through time and that its meaning is affected by those who see themselves as belonging to such 
identity. Fearon and Laitin (2000, p.847) contend that there are three categories of explanations 
of how conflictual identities are formed: “those based on discursive logics, those based on the 
strategic actions of elites, and those based on the strategic actions of the masses”.  
Nevertheless, and according to Avruck (1995), we should include culture in our 
assessments of conflicts, particularly, on its resolution and peacemaking. A simple way on how 
to include culture would be by acknowledging that culture shapes our view of the world’s social, 
political, religious, economic, and psychological context.   
An example of how culture can produce roots for civil war may be on how identity is 
shaped and manipulated by elites. Whether such agendas include the control of public resources 
or overthrow those in power, ethnic or religious leaders have the power to manipulate groups 
into violent conflict. It seems reasonable to argue that culture is always present in our daily lives, 
and the fact that we have different cultural backgrounds, conflict will always exist. Whether it is 
a conflict of interest or a violent conflict, and that it has a direct influence on the conflict or not, 
culture will always be present in the way we shape the world and how we cope with problems 
and solve conflicts. 
Political approach to civil war 
Political theories of civil war focus on political oppression, collapsing institutions, system 
transition, or informational problems as sources for conflict. Key in political theories of civil war 
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is the idea of (relative) deprivation (Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 1978). When members of a collectivity 
feel deprived of their expectations (e.g. political rights), a sense of violation or injustice arises 
among them. Such feelings of injustice or resentments generate opportunities to justify violent 
action. The occurrence of such violent acts is directly dependent on the costs associated with it, 
i.e. expected deaths, and the possible gains that may result from it, e.g. overthrow oppressive 
government. Hence, the probability of rebel group formation and episodes of violent 
confrontation is directly linked to the opportunities available.  
When analyzing civil wars, scholars have tended to deal with these issues by analyzing 
questions related to state legitimacy, weak institutions, regime transition, political oppression and 
lack of political rights, state’s inefficient control of its territory and incapacity to provide 
protection to its population (Przeworksi, 1991). Although there may be other factors behind 
rebellion or protests, emphasis is placed on the existing political system (rulers, parties, 
institutions, policies, or even the state) as a condition that nurtures grievances, which justifies 
rebellion. For instance, Cliffe and Luckham (1999), stemming from the seminal theoretical 
predicaments of Gurr (1970) and Tilly (1978), observed the importance of state building and 
state failure in the occurrence of collective violence and rebel groups’ formation in Africa. Cliffe 
and Luckam (1999) concluded that rebellion, violence and public discontent occurred in 
countries that: (a) lacked power to protect private property (and defend from rebellion); (b) lack 
of political legitimacy, i.e. popular/competitors rejection of the existent regime (or 
constitution/law) as an authority; and, intimately related (c) weak political institutions, e.g. 
general belief that institutions are unrepresentative and corrupt. When these conditions 
(opportunities) occur, the government can no longer have stability to rule, hence state failure – 
the collapse of the existing political structure.  
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Similarly, Hegre et al (2001) contend that political instability and regime transition create 
opportunities for violence and political protest and further exacerbates grievances. They have 
found that intermediate regimes (in a democracy-autocracy index) are more prone to conflict 
than democracies or autocracies. As the authors argued, such conflict-prone condition is due to 
the fact that such intermediate regimes (or semidemocracies) do not possess either enough 
control over its population, thus unable to prevent violence, or democratically inclusive and 
stable so as to keep feelings of resentment and injustice from occurring. In addition, the 
likelihood that a country faces conflict and violence is directly linked with the level of 
political/state repression (Lichbach, 1987). Gupta, Singh and Sprague (1993) concluded that high 
and low levels of political repression tend to reduce violent protests in nondemocracies1, while 
having the inverse effect in democratic regimes2. In contrast, Rasler (1996) contend that political 
repression prevents conflict in the short-run, while encouraging it in the long-run. Moreover, 
Moore (1998) tested the above three theories of violent protest and corroborates Lichbach’s 
(1987) theory. These results seem to concur with the previous political theories on civil war and 
empirical data, that is, violent protest and civil war occur in semidemocracies, states that are 
neither able to authoritatively subdue its population under the rule of law or to be inclusive 
enough to constitutionally enforce equal share of political and human rights (Hegre et al, 2001).  
Kalyvas (2006) study of the Greek civil war contends that the distribution of information 
is critical in explaining the dynamics between insurgents and government. He contends that “the 
                                                 
1
 The costs of protest, i.e. deaths, under an autocratic regime are high as such regimes disregard human 
rights and will respond to such acts with high level of coercion (Gupta, Singh and Sprague 1993). 
2
 Under a democratic regime and constitutional law, all fundamental human rights must be guaranteed; 
otherwise protests and/or violent confrontation is expected to occur. 
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institutions that govern the distribution of information determine the likelihood and severity of 
retaliations”. 
Gates (2002) explores how rebel recruitment occurs. He asserts that rebel recruitment is 
made easier if cultural (ethnic/religious identity), ideological and geographical proximity exists 
between rebels and leader. But what motivates a person to join a rebel group? Gates contends 
that, besides the cultural, ideological and geographical proximity, there are a number of benefits 
to rebels. These will vary according to their activities. As Gates (2002) states, “loot-seeking 
groups will rely on wages and other pecuniary rewards”, such as drugs or alcohol, “distributed 
from their rent-seeking activities”, whereas “ideological groups (…) rely on nonpecuniary 
rewards of fighting the ‘good fight’” (p.114). These include functional (reward’s value is 
associated with task itself) and solidary benefits. His study stands as a bridge between macro-
econometric studies of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998), and the micro-foundations of 
individual behavior in civil war. 
Recent studies (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Berdal and Malone, 2001) tested the different 
motivations for rebel group formation and political violence. They claim that civil conflicts are 
not due to profound religious divisions, political repression or inequality, but because there is a 
number of “opportunities for predation”.  Hence, rebellion is motivated by the expected financial 
benefits of looting. However, Herbst (2000) notes that in many African wars, pure economic 
motives are not consistent with the behavior of rebel leaders. In many of these cases there is a 
persistence of ideological beliefs, political inequality and a constant struggle for power.  
Furthermore, Gurr (2000) highlights what he considers to be the main determinants of 
civil war: “the salience of ethnocultural identity, as it relates to other types of socio-economic 
identities; the level of grievance (actual or expected); the capacity of ethnopolitical groups to 
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mobilize (a function of their cohesion); and the available opportunities for political action by 
each group” (Sambanis, 2002). Gurr (2000) contends that the risk of ethnopolitical action 
decreases in well-established democracies as they provide opportunities for peaceful conflict 
resolution. His work on political violence discusses the rational (choice theory) uses of violence, 
that is, violence is the outcome of a rational pursuit of individual/group self-interest, and the 
social construction of identity that is often used as a mobilization device. 
Political theories on civil war are particularly relevant in the analysis of post-war 
peacebuilding. Most of the literature on post-war peacebuilding has focused on the political 
process, e.g. institutional failure, loss of political legitimacy (Doyle et al, 1997; Durch, 1993). 
Mason and Fett (1996) indicated that negotiation settlement was more likely after long civil war 
wars and where the government’s military was small. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) contented that 
the “space for post-war peace is determined by the interaction of the root causes of the war, the 
local capacities for change, and the magnitude and type of international assistance”, and while 
“significant human suffering and a large number of hostile factions reduce the likelihood of 
successful peacebuilding after civil war, the probability of success increases with the level of 
economic development and with the deployment of well-prepared and properly mandated UN 
peace operations” (Sambanis, 2002). 
Economic approach to civil war 
Generally, economic explanations for war either emphasize the role of economic growth 
and modernization, or view war as a rational choice (violence as a strategy to achieve interests). 
Past historical examples can help us to illustrate these two perspectives. The idea that 
modernization and economic growth make war more likely, can be seen for instance in the New 
Imperialism period (c. 1880s-1914). In a move to modernize and become economically superior, 
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European states scrambled for territory, wealth and scarce resources in Africa. It is commonly 
stated that the fight/competition between the European states over wealth and scarce resources in 
Africa led to the First World War (Arendt, 1958). The same reasoning can be applied to civil 
wars. Newman (1991) argues that ethnic group conflicts are a result of the structural changes that 
economic growth and modernization create. In other words, the process of growth and 
modernization generates rapid socio-economic changes, which result in group competition over 
valuable resources. Newman’s (1991) theoretical argument is backed up by the severe group 
competition over scarce valuable resources in the Middle East region, e.g. water scarcity in the 
Jordan River basin. Moreover, “the process of modernization explains not only the origins of 
ethnic conflict but also the form of that conflict, and the success or failure of specific ethnic 
political movements” (Newman, 1991, p. 452). It is important to mention that although Marxists 
and Capitalists have different views on the what free trade and economic modernization has 
achieved in the past – Marxists view modernization and competition under capitalist ideals as the 
source of war and violence, whereas capitalists argue that free trade and modernization leads to 
interdependence and peaceful coexistence – both perspectives seem to agree that the end result, 
particularly in Africa, was an increase in group competition and civil strife3 (Jackson and 
Sorensen, 2006) 
  However, as Newman (1991) and Horowitz (1985) point out, although the modernization 
and development paradigms argued that growing interethnic social and economic activity 
increases the likelihood of conflict between ethnic groups, it fails to explain why such ethnic 
                                                 
3
 From a Marxist perspective, capitalism is like an economic war, where different groups compete to have 
access to valuable resources, making war more likely. In contrast, Capitalists argue that violence and conflicts in the 
Middle East and Africa are a result of state borders and protectionism, a consequence of not having free trade 
(Jackson and Sorensen, 2006). 
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conflict occur in countries with low economic modernization, such as Chad or Sudan. Clearly, 
not all violent confrontation between ethnic groups can be explained by the modernization 
theory. 
Scholars like Grossman (1995) and Hirschleifer (1995) have used rational choice theory 
and economic theories of criminal behavior in order to explain why ethnic conflict and civil wars 
persist even with the emergence of modern societies. Particularly, their studies attempt to shed 
some light on the interactions between the parties involved (tradeoffs), its impact on economic 
growth, and ultimately, what constitutes explanations for the outbreak of civil conflict. Grossman 
(1995), sought to theorize what a state (or incumbent ruler) would do in an insurrection scenario 
and its probable outcome. He concluded that the “state’s decision on how much to tax or 
appropriate from its subjects, given an expectation that insurrection may result from too much 
taxation and resources will then have to be shifted to the protection of the state (reducing the net 
value of these rents to the state)” (Sambanis, 2002, p. 221). Hirschleifer (1995), went beyond the 
claim that modernization increases the likelihood of conflict between ethnic groups, and sought 
to explain why war/conflict can in fact be a rational alternative for the parties’ involved. His 
model of conflict concluded that preferences, opportunities, and perceptions determine the 
choice between conflict and settlement. He argues that “the parties’ divergent preferences and 
capabilities develop opportunities for conflict (…) [and] the perception of the likelihood of a 
successful outcome in a conflict enters the calculation of net expected benefits from conflict and 
can result in a party choosing to use violence as a strategy to satisfy its preferences” 
(Hirschleifer, 1995, p. 172). 
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The Collier and Hoeffler Model 
The natural resource-civil war relationship has gained much attention since the 
publication of a study by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). Their study challenges what scholars 
within the political science field have been arguing as motives for rebellion. Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998) advocate that civil wars are motivated by greed, meaning that rebellion is possible due to 
a group of opportunities. Clearly stated, greed-based behaviors for rebellion and, consequently, 
civil strife, are caused due to the availability of economic opportunities. The authors consider 
three main proxies for opportunities: finance availability, cost of recruitment, and cost of 
weaponry. Behind this logic, lies the argument that for rebellion to occur it is needed some sort 
of finance, and natural resources extortion stand as a profitable opportunity for rebellion. 
However, for rebel groups to work and function it is also needed manpower. Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998) advocate that in many countries, rebel organizations can operate due to the low cost of 
recruitment. A third critical element in their analysis is the cost of weapons. They argue that the 
cost of weapons should increase in countries that have experienced higher periods of peace. 
In a special issue published by the Journal of Conflict Resolution in December 2000, 
several scholars conducted their studies in an attempt to refine the economic theories of civil 
war. As Sandler (2000, p. 723) summarizes, the essays presented in the special issue analyze 
violent conflict as the result of appropriative/rational rent-seeking behavior. As we shall see, 
such studies marked a new avenue for research. From this collection of essays, we highlight the 
one of Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000), where the authors claim that the popular idea that 
conflict and war are the outcome of misperceptions, incomplete information or irrationality may 
not necessarily be true. As presented in the authors’ model, despite the fact that a peace 
settlement could be achieved in the short-run, ethnic and national conflicts do not necessarily 
result from irrationality or misunderstandings, in fact such conflicts “can be considered the 
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outcome of calculated gambles as a consequence of the adversaries’ concern for the future”, e.g. 
warlord warfare can be the outcome of plans to that project domination and elimination of other 
competitors or the weakening of their resources (p.794). From these perspectives, we can 
observe that there is no credible commitment to peaceful settlement in an insurrection scenario, 
between rebels and government, or as the above example, between a warlord and his 
competitors. As Collier (2000a) showed, when “rebels are predatory on natural resources, the 
government responds by attempting to defend them, and this gives rise to violent conflict” 
(p.852). 
  Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) contend that civil conflicts are 
not due to ethnic or religious differences, but because there is a number of “opportunities for 
predation” (in Collier and Hoeffler, 1998), or as Fearon and Laitin (2003) put it, a group of 
“conditions that favor insurgency”. Here, rebellion/insurgency is seen as a rational decision (and 
much frequent), as countries experiencing civil war have high levels of poverty (which favors 
rebel recruitment), weak political institutions (which increase opposition and reduces legitimacy) 
and large populations (the higher the population size, the higher the amount of opportunities and 
grievances). The dilemma that states face is that in order to protect its population and private 
property, the state must tax its citizens in order to invest in security and defend itself. On one 
hand, the state must not tax “too” much from its subjects as it may incur in discontent and lower 
economic growth rates (decrease private sector investments). On the other, the greater the tax 
revenue, the higher the risk the state faces from rebel predation, as it constitutes higher rewards 
from capturing the state. It is important to mention that although the benefits for rebels to 
organize and act violently are proportional to the available opportunities for rebellion, the costs 
for rebellion to organize, recruit members and fight also increase. Moreover, both studies expect 
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that countries with high levels of GDP per capita are less prone to rebellion, as costs for rebel 
recruitment become higher. In sum, these perspectives place less emphasis on ethnic/religious 
hatreds and differences, and see rebellion as economically motivated. 
 18 
 
CHAPTER 3 - Proposed Model 
 This essay’s attempt to create a new model stems from the necessity to clarify the causal 
mechanisms that natural resources are said to have on civil war. Although the CH model clearly 
supports the greed approach, some of the economic variables used in the model also account for 
some of the observed grievances. Hence, they could not fully reject the grievance model. 
Nonetheless, the authors fail to account why in cases where the availability of resources is 
scarce, rebellion and civil war still occurs. This is will be our contribution to the model and 
literature on the topic. 
Let us briefly explain what is at stance in this debate and reasoning behind the new 
model. The CH model represents the neoclassical idea of greed-resource abundance in 
explaining civil wars. Supporters of this ‘honey pot’ hypothesis contend that explanations for 
rebellions reside in the abundance of mineral resources, such as oil, diamonds, copper, timber, 
exemplified by the violent conflicts in Congo, Sierra Leonne, Nigeria and Russia, or the 
contraband of coca, coffee and tobacco in Africa and Latin America (Englebert and Ron, 2004; 
de Soysa, 2002; Fearon, 2005; Reynal-Queirol, 2002; Ross, 2006; Sachs and Warner, 2001). 
They contend that natural resources are a curse and that they have a decisive role in the existence 
and prevalence of violent civil conflicts. In order to test these claims, the following hypothesis 
was formed:  
H1= Resource scarcity does not lead to civil wars  
Hence, H1 implies that all the coefficients of the natural resources’ variables are 
simultaneously equal to zero. 
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However, as pointed in this essay, there is another group of scholars, often called Neo-
Malthusians that suggest just the opposite (Dasgupta, 1995; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Renner, 1996; 
Reuveny, 2002). They argue that resource scarcity leads to economic decline, erosion in 
government support, institutional crisis and exacerbates ethnic or religious tensions. All of the 
enumerated consequences increase grievances leading people to rebel and engage in violent 
protests (Diamond, 2005; Gleditsch, 2001; Hauge and Elligsen, 1998). Their argument becomes 
even more pertinent when we are dealing with renewable resources, such as arable land and 
water. Such renewables not only are important to human’s survival, particularly in developing 
countries, but also a major source of employment. Thus, deprivation of such important resources 
leads to rebellion and civil war. For example, when water becomes scarce and land becomes 
infertile, economic declined is observed and people no longer can depend on the local 
environment to extract possible gains and therefore tend to migrate in search of better place to 
live. However, such ‘better place to live’ can be an ethnic or religiously different region from 
theirs and tensions over the share of the ‘shrinking pie’ may arise. (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 
2004; Klare, 2001). As a result of such possible scenario, governments may adopt policies to 
solve the problem, but those may be unpopular further exacerbating grievances.  
H2= Resource scarcity is likely to lead to civil wars 
Hence, H2 implies that the coefficients of the natural resources’ variables are not 
simultaneously equal to zero.  
Using two most popular arguments on the topic – greed and grievance – this essay will 
produce a combined model with variables that portray both arguments. In order to do so, it will 
use one of the most popular models on the topic, the CH model, and test it with new variables 
that can better portray the debate between the two contrasting views. The new variables 
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introduced to the CH model are water resources per capita, and total soil degradation in a 
country. These variables are included in the new model because they have been widely used in 
the literature and are said to portray the grievance-resource scarcity approach. Water per capita is 
expected to be negatively correlated with civil war. On the other hand, soil degradation is 
expected to be positively correlated with civil war. Following this logic, resource abundance is 
expected to decrease the likelihood of war, instead of increasing it as Collier and Hoeffler 
argued. Let us turn now to the research design. 
 21 
CHAPTER 4 - Research Design and Methods 
To examine civil war occurrence, I have used Collier and Hoeffler (1998) dataset and a 
similar limited dependent variable model – Logit. Their war data includes civil war occurrence 
and nonoccurrence from the period of 1960 to 1999, collected by Small and Singer (1992) and 
updated for 1992-99. The variables introduced to the CH model - water per capita and soil 
erosion - were collected from Hauge and Ellingsen (1998), another major study on the causes of 
war. Their data on the environment-related variables were collected as part of the ‘Causes and 
Dynamics of Conflict-Escalation’, a joint research project between the International Peace 
Research Institute in Oslo, and the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala 
University.  Due to the fact that the two datasets have different time periods, and that 
environmental resources data is only available from 1980 onwards, I have decided to frame my 
replication dataset in 5-year periods, for 126 countries, from 1980 to 1995, assuming, in some 
cases, 1992 observations as 1995 values. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable indicates whether episodes of civil war occurred during each 5-
year period. It is coded 1 if civil war occurred and 0 if there was no civil war. Using Singer and 
Small’s (1994) definition, it is considered to be a civil war episode any internal conflict that has 
at least 1,000 combat-related deaths per year. 
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Independent variables 
The independent variables used in this model are: primary commodity exports, secondary 
school enrollment, economic growth, time since previous conflict (peace duration), geographic 
dispersion, population size, social fractionalization, ethnic fractionalization, ethnic dominance, 
democracy, water resources per capita, and soil degradation.  
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue that motives per se cannot account for rebel group 
formation. For a rebel group to form and pursue their agenda, they must have some sort of 
finance. But how do rebel organizations finance their rebellion? The authors consider two types 
of sources: resource extortion, and donations from diasporas4. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) 
operationalized resource predation as the share of primary commodity exports in GDP. These 
included the major commodities produced by each country, ranging from oil or diamonds 
extraction to agricultural goods5.  
According to Collier and Hoeffler (1998) the share of primary commodity exports to its 
GDP proxies the abundance of natural resources, meaning that it should positively correlated 
with civil war occurrence. However, with the inclusion of environmentally-related variables, we 
expect its influence on civil war to decrease, or even to have a negative coefficient.  
Donations from diasporas, that is, emigrant support for rebel groups, is another source of 
finance, as donations constitute funds for rebel movements. This argument found support, for 
instance, in the case of the Tamil Tigers that were being funded by the Tamils in North America 
                                                 
4
 In the later versions of their paper (2004; 2005), Collier and Hoeffler have also considered subventions 
from hostile governments as a critical element in the financing for rebellion. However, this not pertains to the 
original CH model, and therefore, it will not be analyzed here. 
5
 As many have argued (Englebert and Ron, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Ross, 2004) not every commodity is 
related to civil war, however, the purpose of the CH model was to investigate if the countries’ primary commodities 
are correlated with civil war initiation, whether they include drugs or live stock. 
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(Angoustures and Pascal, 1996). As previously mentioned, the second proxy for opportunities is 
the low cost of recruitment. But how do rebels recruit members and why do they follow? Almost 
every civil war considered in the study occurs in developing countries. The living standard in 
many these countries is well below a dollar per day, making desirable any situation of possible 
profit, thus making mobilization almost costless. The low cost of recruitment is controlled for 
secondary school enrollment, economic growth, GDP per capita and ethnic fractionalization. 
These quantitative indicators are argued to low the cost of recruiting. The first two, secondary 
school enrollment and GDP per capita, are highly correlated, thus the avoidance of including 
them together in the same model. The reasoning behind the inclusion of these variables is 
obvious, as they stand as indicators of development. 
School enrollment is argued to be synonym of development and obviously, better 
qualifications. Low levels of school enrollment promote low cost rebel recruitment. We expect it 
to be negatively correlated with civil war, and positively correlated with economic growth. Using 
data from the World Bank Development Indicators, 1998, the authors measured male school 
enrolment rates as “the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown”. 
Economic growth was based on GDP per capita, highly correlated with secondary school 
enrollment, to calculate the average annual growth rate over the previous five years. We expect it 
to be negatively correlated with civil war.  
Social fractionalization, as opposed to social cohesion, hinders a rebel group to function, 
especially if their “listing” process works on an ethnic or religious basis, as it reduces the 
recruitment pool. We expect social fractionalization to be negatively correlated with civil war. 
The fractionalization indices range from zero to 100, where a value of “zero indicates that the 
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society is completely homogenous whereas a value of 100 would characterize a completely 
heterogeneous society.” 
The fifth independent variable is peace duration. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue that 
the low cost of weapons facilitate rebellion. They operationalize the cost of weapons with the 
percentage of previous war episodes and peace duration, measured in months since the last 
conflict. The argument is that greater number of war episodes tends to reduce the cost of 
weapons, thus, it is expected that greater peace periods increase the cost of weapons. We expect 
it to have a negative relationship with civil war. In addition, we interpret longer periods of peace 
as decay in grievances. This variable is measured in months since the end of the previous civil 
war, and for countries which never experienced a civil war, since the end of World War II. 
Both the grievance and greed approach see high levels of geographic dispersion as an 
inhibitor in the effective state control of its population. These approaches contend that a highly 
dispersed population limits the power of a state to uphold the law, thus civilians are subjected to 
the rule of local militias and rebel groups. Hence, we expect it to negatively correlated with civil 
war, as higher the population concentration, lower the likelihood of war – easier for the military 
to control the population. The authors constructed a dispersion index of the population for each 
country. A value of 0 indicates that there is a evenly distributed population, whereas 1 indicates 
that the total population is agglomerated in one major area. The data used was collected from the 
Center for International Earth Science Information Network, International Food Policy Research 
Institute, and World Resources Institute, 2000. 
Risk of conflict is said to be proportional to population size, (Ln population). We expect 
it to be positively correlated with civil war. Using the same logic of Collier and Hoeffler on 
proportionality, we also interpret this as a proxy for grievance, as it is expected that the higher 
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the number of civilians, the greater the grievances. The data source for total population is the 
World Bank Development Indicators 1998. 
However, hatreds and tensions between ethnic or religious groups increase in highly 
fractionalized societies, thus lowering the cost of mobilization. The argument behind ethnic 
fractionalization in favoring low cost recruitment is that ethnic fractionalization enables greater 
elite mobilization through manipulation and stereotyping, thus increasing greater hatreds and 
resentments among the populace. Therefore, we expect ethnic fractionalization to be positively 
correlated with civil war, and negatively correlated with economic growth. Ethnic 
fractionalization is “measured by the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index: it measures the 
probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a given country do not speak the same 
language”.  
Ethnic dominance is expected to be positively correlated with civil war. Thus, the risk of 
conflict increases if a society becomes ethnically dominated. The CH model reported that in 
some cases both ethnic dominance and social fractionalization might be correlated with war. 
They interpret this as initial levels of social fractionalization, or diversity, in a ethnically 
dominated society will be present, but only have an effective role in civil war occurrence if 
diversity increases, decreasing ethnic dominance. The authors have calculated an indicator of 
ethnic dominance, using the ethno-linguistic data from the Atlas Narodov Mira, Department of 
Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the USSR, 1964. Ethnic 
dominance “takes the value of one if one single ethno-linguistic group makes up 45 to 90% of 
the total population and zero otherwise”. 
Political repression (democracy) was included in our regressions as it is prime in the 
grievance approach, as it is said to be object of many grievances and at the heart of civil wars 
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(Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Esteban and Ray, 1994). This measure of political rights was used in 
the CH model but it was insignificant in the models that it was tested and therefore not included 
previously in our analysis and replication. Although it is not our primary goal to assess the role 
of political rights in civil war occurrence, rather to study how the scarcity of vital resources 
affects civil war occurrence, we decided to include it because of its wide use in the literature. We 
expect Political repression to be negatively correlated with civil war. 
Water, particularly in developing countries, is of utmost necessity. Several accounts of 
civilians fighting for such valuable resource, for instance in the Middle East, leads to include it 
here. We expect it to be negatively correlated with civil war. This variable measures the average 
annual internal renewable water resources per capita, where high levels of availability are coded 
0 (over 20.1 thousand cubic meters), average as 1 (between 5.1 and 20 thousand cubic meters), 
and low as 2 (1.1 to 5 thousand cubic meters). Data source: World Resources Institute, 1994. 
Soil degradation is interpreted as a reduction in both arable land and water availability. In 
addition, soil degradation is of no use, leading people to look for other places and better 
conditions, possibly in different ethnic regions or with different religious beliefs, thus increasing 
grievances. We expect it to be positively correlated with civil war. Data source: Global 
Assessment of Soil Degradation, 1992. 
 
Methods 
We collected data for all country 5-year periods in our data set (comprising data between 
1980 and 1995, for 126 countries) and present descriptive statistics for all variables in table 1.1. 
Note that most of them have relatively high standard deviations, hence the dataset used on this 
study as a high degree of statistical dispersion. Succinctly, this leads to the conclusion that we 
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cannot make significant inferences about the mean of each variable because the data indicates 
that each observation is not necessarily clustered around the mean. It is noteworthy that 
Geographic Dispersion of the Population is the variable with the lowest relative level of standard 
deviation (soil degradation is the second lowest) for the overall sample and sub-samples, i.e., all 
countries, countries in “no civil war”, countries in “civil war”: 31%, 31%, and 24% of the mean, 
respectively. Note that the standard deviation is lower in the “civil war” scenario. Soil 
degradation is the second lowest relative level of standard deviation. For the variable peace 
duration the standard deviation is much higher in the “civil war” sub sample (96% of the mean) 
than in any other scenario. This is also true for the GDP per capita variable. 
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Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Sample 
(n=450) 
Std. 
Deviation 
No Civil 
War 
(n=417) 
Std. 
Deviation 
Civil 
War 
(n=33) 
Std. 
Deviation 
War starts 0.073 0.260 0 0 1 1 
Primary 
commodity 
exports/GDP 
0.150 0.141 0.149 0.143 0.136 0.116 
Male secondary 
schooling 
53.71 31.61 54.68 31.70 39.14 24.60 
GDP per capita 
(average growth 
for previous 5 
years) 
0.754 3.45 0.89 3.33 -0.442 3.79 
Peace duration 
(months since last 
conflict) 
408.3 172.8 423.64 160.43 214.60 206.87 
Geographic 
dispersion of the 
population (Gini) 
0.610 0.187 0.605 0.187 0.617 0.147 
Religious 
fractionalization 
(index, 0-100) 
37.04 24.6 36.66 24.67 36.68 24.68 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
(index, 0-100) 
41.85 29.1 40.86 28.78 52.86 28.33 
Ethnic 
dominance (% 
with main ethnic 
group 45-90%) 
0.464 0.499 0.468 0.499 0.482 0.502 
Water per capita 1.28 0.860 1.29 0.85 1.32 0.84 
Soil degradation 2.10 0.765 2.08 0.76 2.35 0.73 
 
In order to assess the role of these explanatory variables on the likelihood of civil war, 3 
different logit regressions will be presented. The first is the baseline model from Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998) plus political repression (democracy). As already stated, themain reason to 
include it in our analysis is due to the fact that weak political rights are said to promote 
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grievances. Moreover, we expect it to further validate our resource scarcity hypothesis as 
deprivation of vital natural resources may foster civilian discontent over government’s social and 
economic policies. Then, in our second regression we will introduce the variables we argue to 
portray the resource scarcity argument, water per capita and soil degradation to the CH baseline 
model. The third regression will test the variables on greed, primary commodity exports and its 
square (to account for nonlinear relationship), male secondary school enrollment, economic 
growth, peace duration, geographic dispersion, population size and social fractionalization with 
those we argue to represent the scarcity argument. Our fourth regression will test grievance-
related variables, peace duration, geographic dispersion, population size, social fractionalization, 
ethnic fractionalization, ethnic dominance, and democracy with those on the scarcity argument. 
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CHAPTER 5 - Replication of the CH Model 
In order to test their theoretical argument, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) constructed two 
brief models that included the economic variables said to account the greed-led motivations, and 
those often enumerated by the grievance approach. The results obtained by the opportunity 
model are greatly tuned with the ‘greed’ hypothesis. Although mountainous terrain (safe haven 
for rebels), previous war episodes (since 1945), and donations from diasporas are insignificant, 
all other variables that portray the greed approach - primary commodities, secondary school 
enrollment, economic growth, GDP per capita, and peace years - are highly significant and with 
the expected sign. Prime in Collier and Hoeffler (1998) explanation for rebellion is that primary 
commodity exports has a significant role in explaining civil war occurrence and that this 
relationship is non-linear, which further increases its relevance. In particular, Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998) advocate that the risk of conflict reaches its peak when primary commodity 
exports constitute 32 percent of Gross Domestic Product. It is noteworthy that if a country is 
experiencing such ratio then it is highly dependent on international trade, as 32 percent of its 
Gross Domestic Product comes from selling those commodities to foreign countries. 
It is also important to mention that the authors introduced an ‘oil versus nonoil scenario’ 
in order to assess if a change in oil versus nonoil dependence could alter the probability of a war. 
They concluded that oil has the same effects as other commodities, but a low level of oil 
dependence has fewer risks than high levels of dependence. Other critical indicators for 
rebellion, school enrollment and economic growth, are also significant at the 95% level and with 
the expected sign.  
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From the coefficients on ‘grievance’ only ethnic dominance and ethnic fractionalization 
are significantly correlated with civil war. Ethnic fractionalization does facilitate recruitment but 
high levels of social fractionalization (religious and ethnic fractionalization added together) may 
hinder the rebel organization to function. An attempt to create a homogenous and cohesive group 
in a highly fractionalized society may be difficult as social fractionalization reduces the 
recruitment pool. Nevertheless, the authors interpreted high levels of ethnic fractionalization as 
proxy for hatred and resentment between elites and populace, thus facilitating rebel recruitment. 
Ethnic dominance wears a nonlinear character, i.e. a homogeneous society is likely to become 
ethnically dominated, but higher levels of diversity have a reversed effect on the occurrence of 
civil war6. Therefore, the probability of war starts in an ethnically dominated society is high. 
Other proclaimed variables on grievances - inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization, and 
religious fractionalization - were insignificant.  
It is also important to mention that the risk of conflict is proportional to population size. 
Its use throughout the models proved it to be important, as it is significant and supports the 
theoretical argument that the higher population, the higher the risk of conflicts. This idea is 
coherent with both ‘resource abundance’ and ‘resource scarcity’ arguments. The higher the 
population size, the higher the amount of opportunities and grievances. Nevertheless, the authors 
have suggested that the likelihood of population size to intervene in the risk of civil war is higher 
in a ‘resource abundance’ scenario.  
Let us turn now to the replication7 of the study by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). Of the 
seven potential models presented by Collier and Hoeffler, I selected those 3 models with the 
                                                 
6
 Diversity has positive effect in the reduction of dominance but at a certain amount. 
7
 The dataset for replication was available through Anke Hoeffler’s web page, at 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/g&g.zip  
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highest number of statistically significant coefficients. Then, I proceed by assessing the 
significance of those variables on a new dataset (comprising data between 1980 and 1995, for 
126 countries), and ultimately, test if the model fails to explain civil war, i.e., if we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis: all coefficients of the CH model are equal to zero.  
The results of the logit regressions are reported in Table 2.1. As shown in the first model 
(column 1), every variable, except GDP growth and peace duration, failed to have significance. 
This may be due to the fact that both N and number of wars have been reduced, from 665 (CH) 
to 354 (new dataset). However, models 2 and 3 suggest that that might not be relevant in our 
case. Peace duration significance at 5 percent level and expected sign may be interpreted as a 
reduction in conflict-induced grievances, however, it also supports the opportunity argument. 
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Table 2.1 Combined opportunity and grievance model 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Primary commodity exports/GDP 8.4693 
(6.975) 
41.07*** 
(17.89) 
27.938** 
(15.583) 
(Primary commodity 
exports/GDP)2 
-10.470 
(13.16) 
-94.816** 
(47.73) 
-66.380* 
(45.943) 
Male secondary school 
enrollment 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.030** 
(0.017) 
-0.023* 
(0.012) 
(GDP Growth) t-1 -0.126** 
(0.066) 
-0.069 
(0.093) 
-0.147** 
(0.067) 
Peace duration -0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.0018) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Geographic dispersion -0.930 
(1.426) 
-1.7572 
(2.032) 
-1.349 
(1.546) 
Ln population 0.293 
(0.252) 
0.672** 
(0.322) 
0.642** 
(0.296) 
Social fractionalization -0.00009 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.009 
(0.028) 
 
Ethnic dominace (45-90%)  2.10* 
(1.32) 
0.038 
(0.531) 
Primary commodity exports/GDP 
x oil dummy 
  -18.011* 
(11.779) 
(Primary commodity 
exports/GDP x oil dummy)2 
  58.702* 
(42.974) 
N 354 257 330 
No. of wars 33 33 33 
Chi2 test 0.0000 0.0187 0.0000 
Log-likelihood -66.07 -44.98 -59.38 
Note: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively, in one-tailed test. 
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Model 2 has fewer observations, and still, the variables presented have become 
significant. The indicator for the financing of rebellion, primary commodity exports, and its 
squared are significant at the 5 percent level. CH advocates that the risk of conflict reaches its 
peak when primary commodity exports constitute 32 percent of Gross Domestic Product. 
However, our model 2 suggest that it may reach its peak when primary commodity constitute 22 
percent of GDP, meaning that if a country experiences such ratio then it is highly dependent on 
international trade, as 22% of its GDP comes from selling those commodities to foreign 
countries. Surprisingly, indicators for low cost recruitment, male secondary school enrollment, 
economic growth and ethnic dominance, are all only marginally significant. Similarly to what 
was reported by the CH model, ethnic fractionalization is insignificant. As suggested by the 
authors and reported in Table 2.1, the greed approach finds reasoning in such results, i.e., we fail 
to reject the null hypothesis mentioned above, namely for model 2. Surprisingly, geographic 
dispersion is insignificant. Widely cited as a major inhibitor of state action, it was expected it to 
be significant and positively correlated with civil war. Population size is significant at the 5 
percent level and with the expected sign. Social fractionalization was significant in all 3 selected 
models from Collier and Hoeffler, here, however, is only at the 10 percent level in model 3.  
Although, the chi-square test suggests a strong explanatory power for model 2, its log-likelihood 
suggests otherwise. There was an increase in the number of significant variables from model 1 to 
model 2, however, based on its log-likelihood we cannot say that there was significant 
improvement as model 2 has a lower log-likelihood. 
Model 3, on the other hand, has a higher explanatory power (log-likelihood) than model 
2. In line with the greed approach, primary commodity and its square are significant at the 5 and 
10 percent level, respectively. This model suggests that the risk of conflict reaches its peak when 
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primary commodity exports constitute 30 percent of GDP, which is close to the 32 percent 
reported in CH. Of all indicators for low cost recruitment, only male secondary school 
enrollment and economic growth are significant at the 10 percent level.  
Ethnic dominance and geographic dispersion are insignificant. Favoring both ‘greed’ and 
‘grievance’ arguments, peace duration was significant in 4 out 7 models reported in their study. 
Here it is significant at the 1 percent level in column 3. Population size is significant at the 5 
percent level and with the expected sign. Social fractionalization is significant in all 3 selected 
models from Collier and Hoeffler, here, however, is only at the 10 percent level in column 3. It is 
important to note that ethnic fractionalization was originally excluded by CH in order to increase 
the number of observations. The authors introduced an ‘oil versus nonoil scenario’ in order to 
assess if a change in oil versus nonoil dependence could alter the probability of a war. They 
concluded that oil as the same effects as other commodities, but a low level of oil dependence 
has less risks than high levels of dependence. Its significance in model 3, further validates their 
argument. The chi-square test suggests a strong explanatory power of the models used.  
The CH model stands as a major critic to the grievance argument widely supported within 
the field of political science. However, in order to fully reject the grievance approach we need to 
go beyond variables such as ethnic and religious fractionalization to incorporate other widely 
used grievance-related variables. Certainly, social fractionalization (ethnic and religious 
fractionalization), geographic dispersion and ethnic dominance cover a great amount of the 
argument, but it is not exhaustive. From the wide literature on civil wars, it is this essay’s 
argument that the authors overlooked one critical element: in some cases, civil war occurrence is 
not caused by the abundance of resources; rather at heart of many civil wars we find that 
grievances provoked by resource scarcity increase the likelihood of civil war. It is true that oil 
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and diamonds are abundant in Africa and that such resources have been cursing those peoples to 
fight against each other. However, it is also true that water and arable land is major issue in the 
Middle East, having originated rebellion and violent civil strife.  
As suggested earlier, the ‘resource scarcity’ argument founds theoretical support in the 
grievance approach because in a resource scarcity scenario, renewables such as arable land and 
water become oddly distributed among the population or at least leads to greater deprivation. 
Thus, such deprivation is object of grievances, which can be increased if other relevant factors 
such as inter-group tensions or political repression exist. Such specific conditions are said to lead 
to civil war. Another reason for us to somewhat merge resource scarcity and grievance 
approaches lies on the fact that, according to Collier and Hoeffler (1998), civil war occurrence is 
motivated by greed. Thus, it is hard to speculate that scarce resources such as arable land and 
water would motivate greed behaviors as does the abundance of oil or diamonds. Moreover, it is 
not feasible to export arable land or water, as other primary commodities are. It should be 
pointed out that we are not trying to discredit the greed approach. In fact, our results in Table 1.1 
show that the greed approach has more explanatory power. We propose ourselves to see the role 
of scarce resources, particularly, water and arable land, in the occurrence of civil war.  Since, 
evidence supports our claims (Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Gleditsch, 2001) 
that the deprivation of scarce resources might induce civil war occurrence, and also due to the 
fact that our variables were not included in the CH model, it becomes pertinent to test them 
under the CH model on civil war. We now turn to a new model proposed in this essay.  
The next section tests our two hypotheses: 
H1= Resource scarcity does not lead to civil wars  
H2= Resource scarcity is likely to lead to civil wars 
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CHAPTER 6 - Environmental Scarcity and the CH Model 
As we have hypothesized, resource scarcity may impact the likelihood of civil war, thus 
H1 is rejected, as at least one of the coefficients for the resource scarcity variables is statistically 
significantly different from zero in the logit regressions number 2, 3 and 4, shown in Table 3.1 - 
note that the number of observations varies for each regression because some were dropped due 
to the lack of data. Although we do confirm that the greed argument has more explanatory 
power, we cannot, nor Collier and Hoeffler, fully reject the grievance argument. Furthermore, 
results in Table 3.1 suggest that we should not exclude soil degradation and water resources 
variables from a model on civil war. We have used multicollinnearity detection methods in all 
models as suggested by Farrar and Glauber (1967). The diagnostics results show a Variation 
Inflation Factor below 10, which as rule of thumb indicates no harmful collinearity. 
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Table 3.1 Proposed Model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
Primary commodity exports/GDP 28.231** 
(15.571) 
41.869** 
(21.393) 
4.390 
(6.089) 
 
(Primary commodity 
exports/GDP)2 
-66.95* 
(45.83) 
-121.8* 
(76.85) 
-5.155 
(11.22) 
 
Primary commodity exports/GDP x 
oil dummy 
-18.46* 
(11.834) 
-29.417** 
(16.364) 
  
(Primary commodity exports/GDP 
x oil dummy)2 
59.335* 
(42.985) 
112.61* 
(72.971) 
  
Male secondary school enrollment -0.022** 
(0.013) 
-0.022* 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
 
(GDP growth) t-1 -0.142** 
(0.068) 
-0.151** 
(0.070) 
-0.111* 
(0.063) 
 
Peace duration -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Geographic dispersion -1.310 
(1.544) 
-1.960 
(1.738) 
-1.135 
(1.550) 
0.078 
(1.310) 
Ln population 0.653** 
(0.299) 
0.834*** 
(0.323) 
0.281* 
(0.194) 
0.203* 
(0.150) 
Democracy -0.030 
(0.083) 
-0.077 
(0.090) 
-0.046 
(0.078) 
-0.101* 
(0.067) 
Social fractionalization -0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
 0.00005 
(0.0001) 
Ethnic dominance (45-90%) 0.034 
(0.532) 
0.404 
(0.585) 
 0.294 
(0.462) 
Ethnic fractionalization    -0.00006 
(0.122) 
Water per capita  -0.456 
(0.359) 
-0.360 
(340) 
-0.519** 
(0.290) 
Soil degradation  0.809** 
(0.424) 
0.690** 
(0.378) 
0.562** 
(0.324) 
N 330 323 351 401 
No. of wars 33 33 33 33 
Chi2 test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log-likelihood -59.31 -54.72 -64.41 -83.14 
Note: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively, in one-tailed test. 
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In our baseline model, model 1, primary commodity exports and its square are significant 
at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively, with the expected sign. This suggests that we can be 
95% confident that primary commodity exports have a significant effect on the outbreak for 
rebellion. It also shows that the risk of conflict reaches its peak when primary commodity 
exports constitute only 30 percent of GDP.  However, we were not able to assess the role of oil8 
in the outbreak of civil war, as it was insignificant (not reported here). Male secondary school 
enrollment is significant at the 5 percent level and with the expected sign. As suggested by 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) low levels of education tend to reduce the cost of rebel recruitment. 
With the expected sign, economic growth was significant at the 5 percent level in column 1. Its 
negative relationship with civil war, once again, proved that high levels of development tend to 
increase welfare, thus, making war costly and imprudent. Similarly to Collier and Hoeffler’s 
(1998) findings, peace duration was significant at the 1 percent level. As suggested by the 
authors, time heals. Its negative sign confirms the theory behind it, that is, not only peace 
promotes fewer tendencies for conflict and tensions, but also it discourages people to fight 
violently (including the use of weapons). Surprisingly, geographic dispersion was insignificant in 
all models. Population growth was significant at the 5 percent level. This lends support for both 
the greed and grievance approach, that is, conflict risk is proportional to population size. Social 
fractionalization is significant at the 5 percent level and with the expected sign, proving that high 
levels of social fractionalization hinder a rebel group to function and reduces the recruitment 
pool. Ethnic dominance and democracy were both insignificant but with the expected sign. The 
chi-square test suggests a strong explanatory power.  
                                                 
8
 We have created a dummy variable for oil and test it in our regressions. We have found that it was 
insignificant in all models tested. 
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The second model adds our variables to test the two proposed hypotheses. Although the 
number of wars (33) was the same, our number of observation was reduced to 323. In model 2, 
primary commodity exports is significant at the 5 percent level, and the role of oil in civil war 
occurrence is significant at the 5 percent level. Secondary school enrollment is significant at the 
10 percent level, and both economic growth and social fractionalization were significant at the 5 
percent level. Peace and population size are significant at the 1 percent level. Finally, water per 
capita is insignificant but with the expected sign, and soil degradation is significant at the 5 
percent level. All other variables were insignificant. The chi-square test suggests a strong 
explanatory power. 
In the third model, we dropped the oil dummy due to sample size, and grievance-related 
variables, social fractionalization, ethnic fractionalization and ethnic dominance. By doing so, 
we were able to have a small increase in the number of observations. Here, we wanted to test 
only those variables on greed with the ones on scarcity. From this model, we highlight the high 
significance of peace duration (1 percent level), economic growth (5 percent level), soil 
degradation (5 percent level) and population size (10 percent level). CH main argument, that is, 
primary commodity exports has a significant role in explaining civil war occurrence and that this 
relationship is non-linear, proved to be flawed in our third model – they lost significance. Male 
secondary school enrollment, geographic dispersion, social fractionalization, water per capita 
and democracy are also insignificant. In addition, both chi-square test and its log-likelihood 
proves this model has strong explanatory power, and that there was a significantly improvement 
in contrast with all previous models. 
Our fourth model tests the effects of the grievance-related variables, peace duration, 
geographic dispersion, population size, social fractionalization, ethnic fractionalization, ethnic 
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dominance and democracy with those on the scarcity argument, water per capita and soil 
degradation on civil war occurrence. Not only there was an improvement of the model, but also 
our critical variables significant to back up our theory. Peace duration is significant at the 1 
percent level, population size and democracy at the 10 percent level, and water per capita and 
soil degradation significant at the 5 percent level and with the expected signs. As previously 
mentioned, these variables stand as the basis of the grievance-scarcity argument, that is, high 
periods of peace and fairly distributed water resources have a positive effect in the reduction of 
grievances and civil wars. It is also important to mention that we were able to increase the 
number of observations (401) and that the chi-square test suggests a strong explanatory power. 
Moreover, the model’s high log-likelihood not only shows an improvement to the previous 
models, but also proves it to be the best model.  
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argued that primary commodity exports have a significant 
role in explaining civil war occurrence and that this relationship is non-linear, which further 
increases its relevance. In particular, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) advocate that the risk of 
conflict reaches its peak when primary commodity exports constitute 32 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product. Although we were able to replicate and our results back up their theory, our 
models on greed (model 3) and grievance (model 4) disprove their claims, as the variables used 
in the CH model, which this thesis was able to replicate, are not significant in my dataset. Even 
though model 2 has larger number of significant variables, its explanatory ability (log likelihood) 
is not as powerful as model 4. The results attained in Table 3.1 further validate our claims initial 
claims. Soil degradation and water per capita significance in our fourth model supports our 
argument that scarcity of vital resources for human survival increases the likelihood of conflict, 
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thus its inclusion in a model on civil war seems to be important for the explanation of its frequent 
occurrence. 
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CHAPTER 7 - Conclusion 
We have briefly reviewed the two main approaches on civil war in the literature. Both the 
greed and grievance theoretical arguments have been supported by a variety of qualitative and 
quantitative studies. However, the greed approach has gained much of the scholarly attention as 
it challenges a major approach to civil war - the grievance approach. With an emphasis on 
opportunities, rather than on demand for rebellion, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) have argued that 
rebellion can be explained through economic terms. They argue that civil war occurs due to a 
group of economic opportunities available that rebels, cleverly, use to finance their activities and 
pursue their agendas. These include the predation of natural resources, low cost in recruiting and 
mobilizing members, and cheap weaponry. In sum, the authors contend that these economic 
opportunities seem to be abundant in the countries analyzed, and therefore, they represent 
explanations for rebellion.  
We have also successfully replicated one the most important econometric models on civil 
war, the CH combined opportunity and grievance model. By doing so, not only were we able to 
see its ‘fit’, but also to test two new variables said to portray the resource scarcity approach on 
civil war occurrence. The inclusion of these variables lies on the fact many observers have been 
arguing that the scarcity of valuable resources leads to economic decline, weak government 
support and institutional crisis, which further exacerbates greater grievances, and such 
grievances are at the heart of many civil wars (Kahl, 2004; Merrick, 2002; Sprinz and 
Vaahtoranta, 1994; Schawartz and Singh, 1999).  
Although the resource scarcity may find support in the grievance argument, we are not 
suggesting that we should abandon the view of rebellion as motivated by greed, in fact, our 
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model further validates the CH argument. What we are suggesting, however, is that when vital 
resources become scarce, civil war is likely to occur. Collier and Hoeffler argue that the 
existence, or abundance, of natural resources is likely to lead to civil war, but as our results 
suggest, the same result can occur when arable land and water resources become scarce. 
Furthermore, our results back up what we initially have suggested, that is the CH model 
overlooked one critical element: the scarcity of vital resources is a source of discontent and 
violent protests, and therefore we should include it in any model that attempts to look for 
explanations on the occurrence of civil war.  
Given the results obtained in Table 3.1, it is plausible that both greed and grievance 
approaches explain civil war, as they constitute reasons for rebellion in different countries. 
Nonetheless, resource scarcity cannot be neglected by either theory. Unfortunately, we are 
unable to fully close this debate, and more research must be done. Much of it is due to the fact 
that environmentally-related variables have only been collected in the last 20 years or so. Should 
we have more periods to analyze, particularly in developing countries, we might have reached to 
a different conclusion, and, perhaps, come to an agreement on the factors leading to civil war. 
I would like to mention that it is my intention to further research this issue, particularly 
the threshold on scarcity and abundance of resources. Furthermore, once we delineate such 
threshold we could investigate if resource scarcity influences human behavior in the same way 
worldwide, or if some changes occur according to ethnicity or religious beliefs. 
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